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A.BS1'RA.CT 
In this paper we call attention to an obvious but often ignored 
condition which must be fulfilled by all definitions in order to 
avoid inconsistencies, namely that a definition is not allowed, neither 
explicitly nor implicitly , to make statements not involving the 
object (or objects) it is defining, except such statements which 
beforehand are assumed to be true as a condition for its applicapability 
(basic legality requirement). If a definition implies or includes 
I 
statements not involving the objects being defined it can be used 
legaly only in those oases in which it is beforehand established 
that the statements in question (legality conditions) are true, or 
in other words when the legality conditions are fulfilled. When 
they are, the definition is called "conditionally legal"; when they 
are not, the definition is "conditionally illegal". If there are no 
legality conditions (implied statements not involving the concepts 
being defined) the definition is ''unconditionally legal". If there 
is an absurd legality condition the definition is "illegal", and 
the defined concept (or concepts) is (are) meaningless under all 
circumstances. 
A number of applications o! this concept in several different 
fields are shown in the paper. It is also shown that the legality 
concept presented above to a large extent overlaps with the existence 
requirement. The very meaning of the concept of existence of a 
defined entity is discussed and it is shown that by an appropriate 
definition of "existence" based on the above legality concept, 
fulfilment of the existence requirement can be used as a legality 
criterium, or as a means to eatablish the legality of a definition 
in the sense specified above, and under the same conditions. However 
the use of our legality concept makes it possible to give a clear 
and rigorous analysis of the lepli ty problema involved in various 
types of Qefinitions and axio•atio systems, which in many cases can 
reveal the choice possibilities available, and help selecting a 
system of mutually consistent postulates for an analytical science. 
A most important observation illustrated by several examples ia that 
in many oaaes a definition-legality problem can have more than one 
solution, and it is a matter of ohoiee which solution is pretered. 
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RULES OF DEFINITION 
1 . Introduction 
This paper deals with some of the ma1n problems related to the 
use of definitions ln analytical sciences. 
lt is costumary to consider the axioms and postulates of several 
mathematical or logical diciplines as a definition or a set of 
definitions of the concepts to be used in the field introduced, 
rather than a set of self·-evident statements. For example the 
ax1oms and po~tulates of euclidean geometry are considered a defi-
nition of the euclidean space and the concepts which are used in 
euclidean geometry. The purpose of this paper is to inquire what 
kind of implications, if any, the use of definitions instead of 
self evident statements as a basis for an analytical dicipline 
will have. As will be shown below, the fact that the basic proposi-
tions on which a science can be built are definitions, has indeed 
an obvious implication whose consequences are in many cases well 
known by other means, and may seem trivial. There are however 
cases 1n which the implications of the definition rules are not 
commonly known, a fact which in some cases can lead to staggering 
consequences (cfr. Barricelli 1981, last two sections dealing 
with Godel's proof). 
We shall start by presenting the definition rules and their more 
obvious implications. Even if many of the implications are facts 
which are well known in different ways, and may seem trivial, the 
reader may not have been aware that they are consequences of the 
definition rules, and that these rules give a common interpretation 
of many appearently unrelated discrepancies and paradoxes of which 
the commonly given interpretations are not always satisfactory. 
2. The function and purpo·se of definitions 
A science based on a series of statements (axioms and/or postulates) 
which can be considered as definitions, or as a single combined 
definition, of the concepts used shall be called an "autonomou::~ 
analytical science''. Two basic requirements which one attempts 
to fulfill t:y a defini t:ion are: 
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'I • The definition must ( explicitly or implicitly) identify 
all the properties of the object (or objects) which is 
(are) being defined. 
2. The definition must not change the mean1ng of any concept 
which is not the one (or the ones) being defined and must 
therefore not make (neither imoJicitly nnr exnli~itly) 
any statement not involving the object (or objects) of the 
definition. 
The first requirement 1.s designated as "completeness" requ ice-
ment. Tl1e second one as "legality" requirement. 
The completeness requirement is designed to make it possible to 
prove all the true statements or theorems which apply to the 
defined object (or objects) without requiring the introduction of 
riew assumptions. The question whether and when this completeness 
requirement can be fulfilled by a set of definitions Cor postulates) 
desisned to be the basis for an autunom9us analytical science, is 
not the main object of this paper, but some aspects of the problem 
will be discussed in the last two sections of the next paper (Bar-
ricelli 1981). 
The legality requirement to be discussed here is designed to 
avoid modifying the meaning of concepts which are not objects of 
the definition, thus implicitly introducing statements whict1 could 
not be proved before and which do not involve the defined objects. 
The basic philosophy behind the legality requirement is that if a 
statement or "would be" theorem can not be proved, it is not legal 
to include it implicitly or explicitly in the definition of a new 
concept which is not mentioned in the statement or would be theo-
t'em whose proof is desired. This procedure would be illegal un-
less it is specifically stated that the new definition is also to 
be considered as a redefinition or a part of the definition of 
some of the concepts used in the theorem. 
The legality requirement will, in our presentation, be used as 
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a substitute for the existence requirement often applied as a 
criterion of definition legality. This criterion can still be 
applied, and the meaning of "existence" is specified ln more pre-
cise terms (see below) by our legality concept. 
An extreme case of illegal definition is the case 1n which a 
definition has absurd or self-contradictory implications. r-t 
will be instructive to study also other possible cases which will 
be designated as cases of "conditionally" illegal definitions. 
3. Examples of definitions. 
One of the most common types of definitions are equations defining 
unknown quantities or unknown functions. The completeness and le-
gality criteria presented above will appear trivial when applied 
to equati'ons, and other methods of defining quanti ties, or classes 
of quantities. Nevertheless, we shall use this as the first ex-
ample, because no other class of definitions 1s so familiar and so 
appropriate to make our point clear. 
Suppose we want to define a certain number of unknowns x, y 
and z by a certain number of equations of the type f(x,y,z)=O 
and possibly some other conditions such as for example x>y and 
z<1Q. The equations and the conditions are the statements which 
define the unknowns x, y and z. This definition is legal if the 
only conclusions or theorems which can be derived from these state-
ments and could not have been proved before these statements were 
made, are theorems involving one or several of the unknowns X, y 
or z. The definition i.'s. illegal or conditionally illegal if some 
of the new conclusions whi'ch can be derived from the definition do 
not involve the defined entities x, y or z. As a result, a system 
in whi~h the number of independent equations is larger than the 
number of unknowns would be illegal. Likewise, to take a familiar 
example, the following system of two linear equations 
(3a) 
a 1x + b 1Y' = c 1 
a 2x + b 2y = c 2 
(3b) 
( 3o) 
(3d) 
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has a solution and is conditionally legal under certain conditions, 
while it has no solution and is condi.tionally illeeal under other 
conditions. Evcnthough the conditions for the existence of 
solutions are well known, it may nevertheless be instructive in 
view of subsequent applications, to analyse this problem on the 
basis of the definition legality concept. · In order to be under all 
conditions a legal definition of the unknowns x ancl y, the system 
(3 a) should neither explicitly nor implicitly contain any 
implications concerning the coeffecients a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , a 2 , b 2 , c 2 
or any expression used in the system (3 a), other than the two 
Lmknowns x and y defined by it. However it is easy to show that 
the system (3 a) actually has some implications concerning the c6effe-
cients which can be derived in the following manner: According to 
(3 a) by using well known properties of determtnants we find: 
or 
= ~·a 1 x + b1y 
a 2x + b 2y 
and likewise 
These two relations imply that if 
= 0 
then both of the conditions 
= 0 
a1 c 1 ~ 
a2c2! 
must be fulfilled: evidently an implication concerning the 
coeffecients a 1 , b1 , c 1 , a 2 , b2 , c 2 , which does not involve the 
defined unknovms x and y. This implication will be called 
"a legality condition" for the definition (3 a). If this leeality 
condition is not fulfilled, the system (3 a) is an illegal definition 
of x and Y• Only if this legality condition is fulfjlled, meaning 
if either the determinant of the system (left side of formula (3 c)) 
is different from zero, or both of the determinants (3· d) are Zc'ro, 
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tbe system may be a legal definition of x and y. 
These are well known to be the same conditions comr:wnly u::::ed in 
order to decide whether the system does or docs not l1ave solutions. 
'l'he existence of the defined concept (or solut:i.on), not only \Vhen 
the definition is in the form of a system of equations, but in 
general, for any kind of definition, is used as a criterion of 
definition legality (see next section). 
The system of eqaations (3a) io a typical example of a det·initior~ 
which is legal when a certain legality condition is fulfilled - in 
which case the definition is called "conditionally legal" - ancl 
illegal when the legality condition is not fulfilled - definition 
"conditionally illegal". 
There arc of course also de:fini tions which are uncondi.tionally 
lecal, such a:3 for example the equation x = ') defining x 
(see next section) and definitions which arc unconditionally illegal, 
such as the Jcfinition 5(xL:3 implying an absurd lccality condition 
5 < 3. 
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.4.~Pofi_!1_~~~~?n ~l.~~~}l.!'.Y .. _l}JL~~~r_lll, 
A prooeduNJ oornrnor1i'r usad to veri.t'y the legcdity of a deflnition 
relies on the assumption that there are certain classes of familiar or 
"trustworthy" concepts (numb8rs, geometric entities, logic concepts etc.) 
which exist or have selfconsistent properties, a sort of wa,y to imply 
that they are legally defined by the properties ascribed to them. 
Once a certain number of trustworthy concepts are given, it is often 
possible to prove the legality of new definitions designed to introduce 
new concepts by the procedure of finding in a trustworthy field of knowledge 
examples of the entities we have defined. This is a very common procedure 
used in order to prove that a defined concept has a meaning by sho,ving 
that there are exmnples of the defined concept (or concepts) in a trust-
worthy field of knowledge. This method of finding examples i.s considered a 
method of proving that the defined entities exist: The existence criteri0n 
of definition legality. Existence is however, a concept difficult to 
define, and perhaps the considerations presented above are as close as we can 
come to a definition of the concept of "existence of a defined object in a 
trustworthy field of knowledge". The value of this "existence criterion" 
is that it insures that the definition can not be used to prove any theorems 
which could not unconditionally be proved before about objects other than 
the defined ones, thus insuring conditional def'inition legality. In fact 
the existence of examples of objects obeying all the statements used in 
the definition, implies that any theorem which can be derived from those 
statements can already be proved, simply by substituting the names of the 
defined objects with the names or designations of the examples which have 
been found. If the theorem does not mention the defined objects such 
name substitutions would not be necessary, but the theorem would still 
have been provable before the definition was given. In other words the 
definition can not be. unconditionally illegal. 
- 8 -
In the case in \-rhich the definition is a system of equations defining a 
certain number of quantities, a way to apply the existence criterion for 
definition legality is to find a solution of the ~quations. The existence 
of a solution would be evidence that the equations ~o not contain self-
contradictions. If there are not conditions for the existence of a solution, 
the equations(or definition) are unconditionally legal. Otherwise the 
definition would be only conditionally legal, and would be illegal when the 
conditions are noi fulfilled. 
Definitions given in the form of an identity between the defined concept 
and an entity or concept belonging to a trustworthy field of knowledge 
(such as x • 5 ) are always legal since they already contain an example, 
of the defined object (the number 5 is an example or an x). 
An important implication of our legality concept is the following: 
Although a defini ti_on might be helpful in proving a theorem not involvi~ 
the defined entity~ it can not be strictly necessary. If it were necessary 
the theorem would not be provable by a legal procedure. 
It should be mentioned however that a"new definition", 
in this connection, means a definition of a new concept given 
independently and not as part of the original definition (or set of 
postulates) applying to the concepts involved in the theorem to be 
proved. A simple illustration of this is the following example. If 
the variables x, y, z are defined by a set of conditions like 
(4a) f(x, y, z) = 0 
in order to prove a theorem such as T(x,y) = 0 , we are not allowed 
to define a new variable u by one or several new conditions like 
(4b) F(x, y, z, u) = 0 
unless we can show that this new definition has no effect on the 
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validity of the proof. In other words we have the choice between 
two alternatives: 
(1) either we shall prove that the new definition (4b) is only used 
as a simplifying procedure for example in order to replace a complex 
expression of the variables x, y, z by a simpler expression u 
(2) or else we will have to concede that the theorem T(x,y) is 
not proved by using the definition (4a) alone, and that also the 
conditions (4b) must be considered part of the definition of 
x, y, z, and not only a separate definition of u. Otherwise we 
would not have proved a theorem but only a legality condition 
for the new definition (4b). 
While these considerations may seem trivial when they are 
applied to mathematical equations, they have not always received the 
attention they deserve in the definition of other logical and 
mathematical concepts. Notice moreover that the legality of the 
procedure does not depend on any considerations other than the 
question whether the theorem T(x,y) = 0 could be proved or could 
not be proved before the new definition was given. 
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5. The handling of condHionaUy legal definitions. 
Conditionally legal definitions have been used many times in the history 
of mathematics and the methods of dealing with this kind of definitions open 
interesting perspectives which will be discussed below. We shall start by 
presenting some examples of such definitions. Only those aspects of the 
various definitions will be discussed which are relevant for the point we 
want to make. 
A The quotient between two numbers A and B is defined as a number B ...,hich, 
when multiplied by B yields the number A. This definition is expressed by 
the fallowing f onnula: 
(Quotient definition) A 
This definition is conditionally illegal., because it implies the 
following statement "if B is zero than A must also be zero". This statement, 
which is a rigorous consequence of the above definition if ~ is any finite 
number, can formallv be expressed by the following symboli.c expression: 
A 
B 
B = o -+ A = o 
This statement does not involve the defined entity which is the quotient 
and does not appear in the above statement. Furthermore this statement 
could not be proved before the above definition was given. Evidently 
the definition is conditionally illegal if the above statement is untrue, 
namely if B = o and A f o. The defiuition of the quotient ~ is conditionally 
legal only in those cases in which either B + o or A = o. 
A method, whic:b we may call "the conservative method", couunonly used 
to deal with this definition is to avoid division by a zero (unless the 
nwn~rator is also zero in which case the quotient is an undetermined 
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number u:>ualJy <:e'n:;idcred of little intt~re!'lt). By thi~; mL·l:hod the usc~ of 
this quotient concept is restricted to those cases in which its definition 
is conditionall~ legal. Another method, which we may call '~he revision 
method" is to extend the concept of number to include so called "infinite 
numbers" for which the rule that multiplication by zero always gives a zero 
is not true. Without this rule the statement 
B o -+ A == o 
can not be derived from the definition of the quotient -~ If ~ is an 
infinite the product ~ does not have to be zero when B is zero. This 
revision method censists in redefining other concepts used in the definition 
(in this -case the concept of number) so that the rule \.Jhich permitted to 
derive an illegal statement from tl_le definition does not apply any longer. 
We will see more examples both of conservative and revision methods of 
handling definitions which are conditionally illegal. 
Th ,,~oA e square root , of a number A is defined by the following equation: 
This is another example of a definition which, before the introduction 
of imaginary numbers was conditionally illegal. In fact from this definition 
one could derive the statement 
A ;: 0 
Stnce A, being the square of a number /A, would have to be positive or 0 as 
long as only real numbers were being considered. This statement does not 
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involve the defined concept which is lA (not A, nor > nor 0) and •::-ould 
not br:.> pr'oved before the definition of lA wat-~ giveJt. ()bviously L)w 
definition of lA :is conditionally illegal when A<O, and conditionally 
legal only when A~O. The conservative method, which for a long time 
was the only method used to deal with this definition, was to avoid 
the use of square roots of negative numbers. A rev1s1on method, 
leading to new concepts whichtoday are commonly applied, has been 
the introduction of imaginary and complex numbers. For these numbers 
') 
the statemeni nL~O is not true, and the definition of square root 
1s therefore unconditionally legal. 
An other example of conditionally legal definitions was the definition 
of the difference between two numbers A and B before negative numbers 
and. the number 0 had been introduced 1n the arithmetical calcules. 
The definition of the difference A - B can be expressed by the follow-
lng statement: 
(A - B) + B = A 
Before.the introduction of negative numbers and the number 0, the 
number A - B would have to be considered as a positive number, and 
an implication of the above definition would have been: 
A > B 
This is a statement not involving the defined concept (A - B) and 
is therefore a legality condition, not a theorem. A conservative 
method originally used in order to deal with this definition may have 
been to use the difference A - B only in those cases in which the 
above legality condition A > B was fulfilled. The method adopted 
today is a revision method based on the introduction of non-positive 
numbers which do not obey the rules implying the above legality con-
dition. 
Just as there are mathematical concepts which must be handled in 
a special way (for example by avoiding divisions by zero and square 
roots of negative numbers) 1n order to avoid problems related to 
definition illegality, there are also logical concepts which require 
careful handling for the same reason. 
One of these concepts is designated by the express1on "itself". There 
are several examples of statements involving the expression "itself" 
which lead to paradoxes or absurdities. Some well known examples are 
"the Liar's paradox" and "Russels' paradox", both of which involve 
this expression· Logical statements involving "itself" are often of 
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the type x +~F(x) (expressing that a statement x 1s a Boolean func-
tion of itself) or the type x E f(x) (where f(x) lS an attribute de-
fined as a function of x which is ascribed to x itself). These cases 
have analogy with the equations of the type x = f(x), which may or 
may not have solutions. Any user of concepts involving the expres-
sion "itself" or substitutes for it would be well advised to consi-
der "itself" as a concept whose definition can be conditionally il-
legal. But, as opposed to some other conditionally illegal concepts 
(such as the concept of quotient or square root) the legality condi-
tions for its definition are not fully explored and we have no safe 
prescription for making sure that they are fulfilled. 
An important implication of the way autonomo11:c; analytical sciences 
are arranged, using definitions, instead of self- vident axioms,is 
·the following: 
Self-contradictory or absurd inferences, detected in autonomous 
analytical sciences, are always indicative of definition legality 
problems arising under the same conditions. 
In fact as long as all the postulates and axioms are considered 
an integral part of the definitions of the concepts we are using, 
there 1s no possibility of deriving selfcontradictions without 
using such definitions, or theorems derived from them. 
Any selfcontradiction discovered can therefore be blamed on a 
definition legality problem or an error. 
- 14 -
6. The use cif conditionally lecal concEpts. 
When usLl!j a concept whose definition is known (or suspected) 
to imply some legality conditions onA is well advi8ed tnkinc some 
precautions in order to avoid poc::;ible legality problems. lJnleu::.> 
the legality conditions are well explored and ~1ovrn to yield a save 
alternative procedure, the precautions one would haye to use are the 
same which are needed when giving a new definition in order to make 
sure that the definition is legal, .or at least not illegally applied. 
Namely: 
(1) Never use the suspected concept neither directly nor under 
other names in order to prove theorems in which the concept 
is not jnvolved (unless one can show that its use is O!lly 
a simplifying procedure whic0: has no effect on the 'falidi ty 
of the argument). 
(2) Expressi9ns in which the suspected concept is used and any 
substitute for such expressions -should be treated as newly defined 
concepts, whose definition iegality must be proved, and cannot 
be taken for granted. 
These precautions can be dispensed of or substituted only if 
the legality condition is well explored. For example we can safely 
use quotients if we take good care of never dividint; by zero, and 
we can safely use square roots in real number algebra if we take 
good care of never using the square root of a negative nwnber. 
But the justification for this procedure is based on the fact that if 
a statement not involving the defined concept (quotient of two numbers 
or square root of a number) can be derived from theorems involving 
this concept, we always know how to derive it from other theorems not 
involving the said concept, if division by zero and square roots of 
negative numbers have been carefp.lly avoided. 
However we have no safe procedure for using statements involving 
the expression "it self'" or substitutes for such statements, in the 
proof of theorems not involving this expression. 
The safest procedure io to treat exprcssionc 
involving the concept "it self" and substitutes for such expressions 
as representing new defined concepts and apply the same precautions 
d f · · ti Th' "'ai'ety proc"dUI'~ -;_,,, \'tor+h ap·.olyinr': required for nev1 e ~n~ · ons. lO .::.c . ~ '' ':; ~-- " _ ~-
nhenever there can be the slightest possibility that d ef:i.n:Ltion 
legal1ty problems may arise in connection with ::my of the concepts 
used. 
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7. A r:eornetric iElplication of tlw definition rules. 
In some areas o:f mathematics, suc\1 as equation tlh~ory where the 
questions relative to the existence or possible inexistence of solutions 
are routinely investigated, adequate definition legality vcrif:i.catio"1:.o 
are commonly applied. 
On the other hand there arc also :wrr:c u.rca:J of n.~1thcr.:~ntic:-:: anrl 
logic in whicll precautions against definition ille;o;ality are inadequate. 
One of these arc~as is geometry, the very scie11cu in r:'1ici; the concept 
that the axiomcs and postulater.:; of an analytical scjc:,cc ore to be 
con~idered as definitions were applied for the first ti~c. Cttc of 
our pro blcms seem to be comjectcd with the fact that r1c arc l..tae,J to 
:u_-..-c in a thTetodimensional sp~CC J anu to US tlw q-:.tc~~tj_on of <3 C fj_lli tiu:! 
lq_;ali t;y in ;_:;e.J~1etry seer:1 to bo j_dt:ntic to the qucsticJc o c· •JE;fini tion 
ler_;e.li ty in a threedimcnsiono.l spo.c c. 'L'hc fact that fo.;:· a twodinwl1Sional 
being our threedimensional space could be physically inexistent is alien 
to us. 
A well knoim theorem of projective geometr:r J.s the so called 
11homolo.gical trianglers theorem", which can be found in all pro.i ecti ve 
geometry treatises. However, for the purpose of the ~J.TQ.lmont 
·;:e are go inc to uake here 7 it j_s sufficient to l::.novr tho.t the t:-woren 
can be forlllulate<l in the projective plane S,.., ar· well aD i;:.1. a three-
dimensional :c;_pacc s 3• !Jut no Vlcl.j has been .fOUl1.d to prOV8 the theorem 
in the projective plane S 0 without using constz~ctions or concepts 
L 
b(;longing to a threedirnens ional space s3 oi' which 
be n part. 
is cupporJed to 
The question one may ask at this point is: 11Can the theorem be 
considered as generally valid in any projective plane, without 
inquiring before hand whether or not the plane i.s part o:f a three-
dimensional space?" Evidently, if the postulates of planar projective 
geometry are to be considered as the defin1tion of the })roj cctive plane, 
the answer to this question is "definitely not 11 • The so called 
"homological trianglers theorem" has not been proved valid in the 
projective plane on the basis of those postulates. The "theorem" has 
been pro~ed by defining some additional entities external to the 
projective s2-plane and belonging to an s3-spacc of which s2 is 
supposed to be part. In other words the only thing which has been 
proved is that if the so called "homological trianglcrs theorem" 
is not valid in a projective S ~~ space, then the dcf'ini tion of an s3 
space containing that s 2 space would be illegal. 'l'he "theorem 11 is 
... 16 -
no theorem at all as far as the projective s2-space is concerned. 
It is only .:1 _lecaL!J.y_condition fot' tlw deriniti.on or· nn :.J.,. r;pacc 
,.! 
containing If that legal1ty condition ia ·rul1'i1l ed, then there 
i:::; a possibility that the definition of an s3 space containing 
would be legal. Otherwise such an s3 space would be illegally 
defined. 
" •) ') 
"-
Notice that in aYl euclidean plane, obeying the metric conditions 
which apply in euclidean geometry, this legality condition would b8 
fulfilled. A proof of the homologica;L trianglers theorem, :for 
example by using analytical geometry without resorting to three-
dimensional considerations, would be messy, but certainly possible. 
'rhe euclidean plane may without reservations be considered part of 
a threediruensional space. The same is not pussible for every 
projective plane, unless a projective proof of the "homolo~jical 
tr:Langlers theorem" can be found which does not resort to three-
dimensional considerations. 
It might be worth inquiring whether a planar pruj er;ti ve geometr;y 
in which the homological trianglcrs theorem is not vo.licl can be 
constructed, and if so v;hat such a ~jeoractTy would looJ~ l.H:c. 1Jikewise 
it may be worth 1nquirine whether thero are threedimensL:mal projective 
geometry "theorems" (or more precis ely "legalj_ t;y condi tiona 11 ) which 
'would apply o:1ly if the projective ;) 3-spa.ce is part of an :3 4 spae c 
but not otherwise. 
Some readers may be inclined to consider a set of poctula~es 
defining a projective 3 0 -plane which does not fulfill all of the needed 
~ 
conditions for being part 
of the projecl~ivc plane. 
o.f an S~-:J}mce as an incomplete cle.finj.tion 
) 
That is however a quention of terrninolo.:3:r. 
If your intention vms to usc the term "projective pl:mc" in order to 
designate an sr, nhich is part of an s7., then the~ de:finj.tion ic 
) 
obviously unsuccessf'ul or incomplete, and would require some additional 
postulates in order to be made complete. If that was not the intention, 
then the definition might be quite acceptable for the concept it is 
intended to designate. 
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One may just apply two diffet'ent terms to designate the two eli f-
ferent concepts, such as the "autonomous projective plane", and the 
"8 3 embedded projective plane". To have proved a theorem by making 
use of 8 3 considerations makes it valid in the 8 3 embedded projecti-
ve plane but not in the autonomous projective plane. That applies 
even if the theorem (like the homological trianglers theorem) can 
be formulated by using exclusively planar geometry concepts. The 
theorem will however not only be unprovable, but also impossible 
to disprove, otherwise planar projective geometry would be in con-
flict with space geometry. This may be an example of a proposition 
which is undecidable (neither provable nor disprovable) in the 
autonomous projective plane. 
8. Autonomous and non-autonomous analytical sc1cnces. 
There is a lesson to be learned from this example: 
If a theorem T(8) which has been formulated in a science or infer-
ence system 8 can be proved only by using arguments which are per-
mitted in an other science or inference system S but not in the 
0 
science 8, one can not without reservations consider that theorem 
as valid in the science 8. One will have to make a distinction 
betwe~n two cases or two versions of the science S. The theorem 
will be valid in a science 8 embedded in S (meaning including as 
0 
extra postulates all statements about 8-concepts which can be pro-
ved by using S ) but not in an autonomous (meaning not embedded) 
0 
science 8. 
The following general rule applies: 
In every autonomous analytical science or demonstration system 8, 
the only propositions which are true are those which can be deri= 
ved from the axioms and postulates defining the science 8. In 
such a system provable is a synonym of true. 
This rule is important for questions concern1ng, for ex. , the 
applicability of Godel's proof in PM or any other science without 
beforehand making sure by other means that it is not and can not 
be organized as an autonomous analytical science. If it can, 
- 18 -
''unprovable" could become a synonym of "untr'ue" and Coclel 's well 
known proposition stating its own unprovability could be made 
equivalent to the liar!s paradox stating its own untruthfulness 
(see Barricelli 1981, last two sections). 
- 19 -
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